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Capturing judgement strategies in risk
assessments with improved quality of
clinical information: How nurses’ strategies
differ from the ecological model
Huiqin Yang1 and Carl Thompson2*
Abstract
Background: Nurses’ risk assessments of patients at risk of deterioration are sometimes suboptimal. Advances in
clinical simulation mean higher quality information can be used as an alternative to traditional paper-based approaches
as a means of improving judgement. This paper tests the hypothesis that nurses’ judgement strategies and policies
change as the quality of information used by nurses in simulation changes.
Methods: Sixty-three student nurses and 34 experienced viewed 25 paper-case based and 25 clinically simulated
scenarios, derived from real cases, and judged whether the (simulated) patient was at ‘risk’ of acute deterioration.
Criteria of judgement “correctness” came from the same real cases. Information relative weights were calculated to
examine judgement policies of individual nurses. Group comparisons of nurses and students under both paper and
clinical simulation conditions were undertaken using non parametric statistical tests. Judgment policies were also
compared to the ecological statistical model. Cumulative relative weights were calculated to assess how much
information nurses used when making judgements. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves were generated to
examine predictive accuracy amongst the nurses.
Results: There were significant variations between nurses’ judgement policies and those optimal policies determined
by the ecological model. Nurses significantly underused the cues of consciousness level, respiration rate, and systolic
blood pressure than the ecological model requires. However, in clinical simulations, they tended to make appropriate
use of heart rate, with non-significant difference in the relative weights of heart rate between clinical simulations and
the ecological model. Experienced nurses paid substantially more attention to respiration rate in the simulated setting
compared to paper cases, while students maintained a similar attentive level to this cue. This led to a non-significant
difference in relative weights of respiration rate between experienced nurses and students.
Conclusions: Improving the quality of information by clinical simulations significantly impacted on nurses’ judgement
policies of risk assessments. Nurses’ judgement strategies also varied with the increased years of experience. Such
variations in processing clinical information may contribute to nurses’ suboptimal judgements in clinical practice.
Constructing predictive models of common judgement situations, and increasing nurses’ awareness of information
weightings in such models may help improve judgements made by nurses.
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Background
Nurses use their judgement to identify patients at risk of
deterioration in acute care. Critical care outreach systems -
often nurse-led - have been implemented as a means of
improving the quality of these judgements [1, 2]. Critical
care outreach systems are usually initiated by track and
trigger systems based on routine observations of airway
adequacy, breathing and circulatory systems. Adverse
observations trigger intervention and management,
often in the form of expertise - such as that offered by
the critical care outreach team.
In order to ensure prompt identification of patients at
risk of clinical deterioration the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) suggests that all
hospital adult patients should receive a minimum set of
physiological observations and a clear written monitor-
ing plan at the time of admission or initial assessment
[3]. These routine observations are often carried out by
ward or emergency department nursing staff and they
should be monitored at least every 12 h [3]. Early recog-
nition of changes to physiological parameters is crucial
to timely intervention and reducing the chances of crit-
ical events [4] and mortality. As up to 62 % of cardiac
arrests are potentially avoidable [5] the evidence is that
this system of identification and intervention, based
largely on clinical judgement, could perform better.
Understanding the underlying mechanisms influencing
information processing in nurses’ unassisted risk assess-
ments – i.e. how nurses weigh and combine information
cues to reach their judgements – would help in the
design of the kinds of complex interventions (such as
critical care outreach systems) likely to improve early
detection and timely intervention in patients at risk of
critical events or deterioration.
Critical events in patients are often preceded by changes
in physiological parameters sometimes hours prior to the
event [6, 7]. The National Confidential Enquiry into
Patient Outcome and Death [8] suggests that approxi-
mately 66 % of patients in hospital for more than 24 h
showed physiological abnormalities at least twelve hours
prior to intensive care unit admission. Abnormal physio-
logical signs are associated with patient mortality: Goldhill
and McNarry [9] found a patient’s mortality risk increased
with the number of physiological abnormalities (P < 0.001),
being 0.7 % with no abnormalities, 4.4 % with one, 9.2 %
with two and 21.3 % with three or more.
Evidence suggests that physiological deterioration is
often unrecognised inadequately treated or dealt with in-
appropriately by healthcare professionals – including
nurses [5, 10, 11]. Suboptimal care prior to critical care
admission is relatively common, with at least 39 % of
acute adult emergency patients being admitted to inten-
sive care late in the clinical course of their illness [12].
Nurses’ failure to act appropriately is a major cause of
suboptimal care: signs of deterioration in the 24 h prior
to cardiac arrest in hospital were not acted on in 48 % of
patients [5]. Aggressively intervening early for critical
events such as myocardial infarction and shock can
significantly reduce mortality [13, 14].
Understanding the underlying cognitive mechanisms of
how nurses process clinical information to make risk as-
sessments can help explain nurses’ suboptimal judgements.
This study aims to:
i) describe nurses’ judgement policies in the
recognition of patients at risk of acute deterioration
ii) investigate whether their policies differ from optimal
strategies derived from statistical models of the
relationship between clinical information/cues and
clinical outcomes (the ecology)
iii) examine whether experienced nurses’ judgement
policies differ from those of novice nurses (on the
basis that clinical experience has been identified as
an important factor influencing clinicians’ judgement
and decision making [15, 16].
With the advent of technologies such as computerised
patient simulators (e.g. Laerdal SimMan™) educators can
recreate far more realistic clinical judgement situations
than traditional “paper-and-pen” patients - substantially
enhancing the quality of clinical information for use in
simulation. We also, therefore, set out to investigate the
hypothesis that nurses’ judgement policies change as the
quality of information in clinical simulations also
changes.
Methods
Capturing judgement policies: Cue utilization validity &
ecological validity
Judgement analysis and the Lens Model of cognition
(see Fig. 1), was used to investigate nurses’ judgement
policies. This model characterises judgement as a
Fig. 1 The Lens Model
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relationship between a judgement and the information
present in an environment (known as the ecology) and
used in a judgement [17, 18]. It is based largely on the
principles of probabilistic functionalism put forward by
Egon Brunswik [19–22].
Using the Lens Model (Fig. 1) to understand judge-
ments requires explication of three important concepts:
ecological validity, cue utilisation validity, and ‘achieve-
ment’ [23]. Ecological validity refers to the correlations
between proximal cues and an ecological criterion [20]
(such as disease classification or level of risk). Cue util-
isation validity refers to correlations between proximal
cues and an individual’s judgements. Achievement refers
to the correlations between the values of an ecological
criterion and the values of an individual’s judgement.
In the Lens Model the left side represents the relation-
ship (i.e. the ecological validity) between proximal cues and
the ecological criterion i.e. how clinical information is
correlated with an actual clinical state. The right side of
the Lens Model represents the relationship (i.e. cue
utilisation validity) between available cues and subjects’
judgements i.e. the importance clinicians attach to clin-
ical information cues. Clinicians’ judgements may (and
crucially, may not) be similar to the weights in the true
ecology. Achievement is captured by the correlation
(i.e. accuracy) between subjects’ judgements and the
ecological criterion. In this paper we focus on cue util-
isation validity and compare it to ecological validity:
how participants use the cues in their judgements as
compared to the weights in a statistical model of the
judgement ecology.
Clinical scenarios and data collection
We used five cues as recommended by NICE [3] to con-
struct the 25 scenarios: systolic blood pressure, heart rate,
respiratory rate, temperature, and levels of consciousness.
The 25 clinical scenarios were randomly sampled from a
large data set of patient case series (n = 673) [24]. Judge-
ment ecological criteria (reference standards) were derived
from the same set of patient case records: the patient
being simulated was classified as at risk if the patient case
was admitted to intensive care units, had cardiopulmonary
resuscitation or died.
All the clinical scenarios were presented as paper cases
in a booklet of clinical vignettes (see the Additional file
1 where the patient name used is a pseudonym). Natural
units (such as mmHg for blood pressure and beats per
minute for Heart rate) that are routinely used in the
current practice were used when presenting these cues.
A patient simulator (Laerdal SimMan) and bedside vital
signs monitor were used to simulate the same clinical
scenarios presented in the booklet of clinical vignettes.
Scenarios and clinical simulations were approved by a
critical care specialist nurse with more than 12 years
specialist nursing experience. Nurses were asked to as-
sess risk of a critical event independently, for each paper
based scenario and then again on a data collection sheet
in clinical simulations. They were asked to complete all
25 scenarios on paper cases and subsequently complete
all 25 scenarios on clinical simulations. Nurses were
instructed not to discuss these scenarios with each other
and recorded their assessments into the data collection
sheet independently. Nurses were solely asked to assess
these scenarios to detect whether the simulated patient
case was at risk of acute deterioration, but they were not
required to take a medical intervention in response to
these scenarios where the patient case was at risk of
acute deterioration.
Ethical approval
Ethical approval was obtained from the Health Sciences
Research Governance Committee of the University of
York, UK. All participants were given the same informa-
tion about the study. All participants completed an in-
formed consent document.
Data analysis
Relative weights of validity coefficients
Relative cue weights for individual nurses in this study
were derived from the cue utilisation validity (the cue-
judgement correlation) and the ecological validity (the
cue-criterion correlation). Relative weights can be derived
from either regression models or cue validities [25]; we de-
rived the relative cue weights for each participant from
cue validities: the cue utilisation validity (cue-judgement
correlation) and the ecological validity (cue-criterion cor-
relation). Cue-judgement and cue-criterion correlations
index a cue’s importance to the prediction of judgements
or criteria (the ecology) [20, 26–28]. The correlations
between cues and judgements indicate the emphasis
judges placed on these cues; the predictive ability
increases when the correlation between each cue and its
dependent variables increases.
For each participant’s model the relative weights of
cues were generated from the validity coefficients by
normalising their absolute values to 1:
rwi ¼
jrYs:Xij
XK
i¼1
jrY s:Xij
To investigate the relative weight of the categorical
variable of consciousness level, use of a single cue weight
represents the judge’s overall emphasis on the information
contained in the categorical cue [25]. In the analysis, the
categorical cue of consciousness level was therefore put in
the model together with other continuous cues to identify
the single overall effect.
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Cumulative relative weights were calculated from the
relative weights of cue utilisation validity to assess how
much information participants used in making their
judgements. The cumulative relative weights of the third
most important cue were taken as the optimal cut-off
measure to evaluate the amount of information partici-
pants have used. A statistical comparison of cumulative
relative weights between participants and the ecological
model was also made.
Where appropriate non-parametric tests were used to
detect the statistical significance of differences in relative
weights between different groups since the data did not
follow a normal distribution. For example, the Wilcoxon
rank-sum test was used to test the significance of the dif-
ference between student and experienced nurse groups.
The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test was used
to test the significance of the difference between paper
case and clinical simulations. A level of p < 0.05 was used
as a cut-off for statistical significance.
Analysis of ROC curves
To identify the model’s predictive accuracy for partici-
pants’ judgements, ROC curves were generated from the
aggregate models of paper cases and clinical simulations.
ROC curves were obtained by plotting the sensitivity
(true positive rate) against 1− specifity (false positive
rate) [29]. The predictive accuracy of alternative logistic
models used were assessed by comparing the areas
under the corresponding ROC curves (AUC) [30]. The
higher the AUC the greater the predictive performance
of the model (an AUC of 0.5 would be “chance” or the
equivalent of flipping an unbiased coin).
Results
Participants
Sixty-three students and 34 experienced nurses took
part. The nurses had an average of 12 years (standard
deviation (SD) 10.0) of clinical experience; the majority
(n = 27, 81 %) were educated to diploma or first degree
level. The mean age of experienced nurses was 36.6 years
(SD 9.9), while the mean age of student nurses was
29.1 years (SD 9.0). 85 % of experienced nurses were
female and 89 % of student nurses were female. The
experienced nurses were recruited from the ward & crit-
ical care registered nurse population in hospitals in
North Yorkshire. The majority of students were 2nd and
3rd year undergraduate nurses and registered for a
diploma in nursing.
Relative weights of Cue utilisation validity & ecological
validity
Experienced nurses vs. Students
In paper cases experienced nurses paid more attention to
consciousness level (median (Mdn) 0.259) than students
(Mdn 0.240), z = −2.39, P = 0.02 and more attention to
systolic blood pressure (Mdn 0.065) than students (Mdn
0.054), z = −1.97, P = 0.048. The experienced nurses paid
less attention to respiration rate (Mdn 0.247) than
students (Med 0.278), z = 2.80, P = 0.005. There was no
significant difference in the relative weights given to heart
rate and temperature by experienced nurses and students.
In clinical simulation settings experienced nurses
paid more attention to consciousness level (Mdn
0.253) than students (Mdn 0.228), z = −3.22, P = 0.001
and systolic blood pressure (Mdn 0.083) than students
(Mdn 0.050), z = −2.50, P = 0.01. The experienced
nurses paid less attention to temperature (Mdn 0.148)
than students (Mdn 0.167), z = 2.41, P = 0.02. There
were no differences in relative weightings given to
heart rate and respiration rate by experienced and
student nurses.
Paper cases vs. the ecology model
In paper cases participants underused the conscious-
ness level cue (Mdn 0.245); the ecological model
suggests a figure of (Mdn) 0.301 would be more appro-
priate (z = −10.14, P < 0.001). They also underused
respiration rate (Mdn 0.275; ecological model requires
(Mdn 0.320), z = −7.19, P < 0.001), and systolic blood pres-
sure (Mdn 0.057; ecological model (Mdn 0.079), z = −6.22,
P < 0.001). In contrast participants over-relied on heart
rate (Mdn 0.265; ecological model (Mdn 0.248), z =
3.43, P < 0.001), and over-relied on temperature (Mdn
0.149; ecological model (Mdn 0.052), z = 10.15, P <
0.001).
Physical simulation vs. the ecology model
In clinical simulation settings participants underused the
consciousness level cue (Mdn 0.236; ecological model
(Mdn 0.301), z = −8.42, P < 0.001); and respiration rate
(Mdn 0.280; ecological model (Mdn 0.320), z = −4.91,
P < 0.001), and systolic blood pressure (Mdn 0.058;
ecological model (Mdn 0.079), z = 3.74, P < 0.001).
Participants over-relied on temperature (Mdn 0.158)
in clinical simulations (ecological model, (Mdn 0.052), z =
8.54, P < 0.001). However, there was no significant differ-
ence in the relative weights of heart rate between clinical
simulation and the ecological model. Because the relative
weight in the ecological model provides an optimal stand-
ard of how the participant should pay an attention to a
particular cue, this non-significant difference in relative
weights of heart rate between the two models indicated
that the clinical simulation setting was associated with
appropriate use of heart rate information.
Analysis of cumulative relative weights
The results showed that participants’ cumulative relative
weights on the third most important cue (Mdn 0.795) in
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paper cases were lower than the equivalent cumulative
relative weights (0.869) in the ecology model z = −10.14,
P < 0.001. Similarly, participants’ cumulative relative
weights on the third most important cue (Mdn
0.788) in clinical simulations were lower than the
equivalent cumulative relative weights (0.869) in the
ecology, z = −8.08, P < 0.001.
Analysis of ROC curves
ROC curves were plotted for hierarchical logistic regres-
sion models for participants at the aggregate level in
paper cases (Fig. 2). Each cue was sequentially entered
into the models based on the ranking of the binary cor-
relations between each cue and the dependent variable
of judgements in paper cases. The AUC area with 95 %
confidence interval (CI) for each model was calculated.
Table 1 illustrates the model performance of the hier-
archical logistic regression of judgement in paper cases.
In the paper cases the AUC curves showed that heart
rate, respiration rate and consciousness level were the three
major predictors of 97 participants’ judgements. The AUC
area for each model was consistent with the cumulative R-
squared of each hierarchical model. Temperature and
systolic blood pressure information was of no added value
in predicting participants’ judgements in paper cases.
ROC Curves were also plotted for hierarchical logistic
regression models for the same 97 participants at the
aggregate level in clinical simulations (Fig. 3). The cues
were sequentially entered into the models based on the
ranking of the binary correlation between each cue and the
dependent variable of judgements in clinical simulations.
Table 2 shows the model performance of the hierarchical
logistic regression of judgement in clinical simulations.
In clinical simulations the ROC curves showed respir-
ation rate, heart rate, and consciousness level were the
three main predictors of participants’ judgements. It
should be noted that the cumulative R-squared of hier-
archical models showed that temperature may still be an
additional contributor in predicting judgements of clin-
ical simulations. However, systolic blood pressure was of
no added value in predicting participants’ judgements in
clinical simulation.
Discussion
There are wide variations in individual nurses’ use of
information cues (based on relative cue weights of cue
utilisation validities) in paper cases and clinical simula-
tions; a finding in line with previous research [31]. Such
variations reflect the substantial differences in cue usage
among individual nurses when faced with different judge-
ment tasks.
Judgement policies compared with the ecological model
Despite such wide variations, nurses both under-values
some cues (consciousness level, respiration rate and
systolic blood pressure) and put too much weight on
others (heart rate and temperature) when faced with
(traditional) paper based scenarios. Similar patterns were
observed in the more “advanced” simulated environment
of the clinical simulator (with the exception that heart
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rate was weighted more appropriately). Both experienced
nurses and students both used more cues than needed to
make appropriate judgements; this matters. Assigning
similar weights to those in the ecology will improve judge-
ment performance. For example less relevant information
can reasonably be ignored [32]. If an irrelevant cue is
weighted, it significantly lowers the utilisation of other rele-
vant cues in a particular judgement, thereby resulting in an
error. Providing nurses with optimal weights using models
of the ecology may minimize their policy variations and
improve judgement achievement.
Judgement policies in experienced nurses and students
Cue utilisation relative weights revealed experienced nurses
and students differs substantially on the cues used to make
risk assessments: experienced nurses rely more on the cues
of consciousness level and systolic blood pressure for risk
ssessment judgements than students. These differences in
relative weighting could be an important source of incon-
sistencies and variations in judgements between
experienced nurses and nurse students.
Judgement policies in paper cases and clinical simulation
Generally, similar patterns of relative weights of cue util-
isation validity were observed in both paper cases and
clinical simulations. But setting impacted on heart rate
(experienced nurses over relied on it for paper cases but
used it more appropriately in clinical simulations) suggest-
ing that clinical simulation may foster a more appropriate
use of at least some information. Moreover, nurses used
more available information in clinical simulations than in
paper cases. It is reasonable then to argue that different
simulation approaches lead to variations in nurses’ judge-
ment policies. This is in line with (or extends the logic of)
studies [33–35], suggesting the format of information
presentation (e.g. pictorial information is substituted for
written description) significantly affects the amount of
information the subjects would use. Importantly, these
findings reveal that, under more natural settings where
the quality of clinical information is improved, nurses use
strategies that are markedly different from those elicited
by paper cases.
Differences in nurse’ judgement strategies between paper
cases and clinical simulations can be explained theoretically
using Cognitive Continuum Theory [36]. According to this
theory, pictorial cues in clinical simulations may induce
more intuition in judgements, whilst more “abstract” (i.e.
less visual) quantitative cues in paper cases will promote a
Table 1 The model performance and the prediction of
judgement in paper cases
Models AUC (95 % CI) Pseudo R2
HR 0.82 (0.80–0.84) 0.26
HR, RR 0.88 (0.86–0.89) 0.42
HR, RR, Consciousness 0.90 (0.88–0.91) 0.45
HR, RR, Consciousness,
Temperature
0.90 (0.88–0.91) 0.45
HR, RR, Consciousness,
Temperature, Systolic BP
0.90 (0.88–0.91) 0.45
HR Heart Rate; RR respiration rate; Systolic BP: systolic blood pressure
Fig. 3 ROC curves of hierarchical models in clinical simulation
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more analytic approach. Therefore, changes in the format
of information presentation may result in marked differ-
ences in judgement strategies between paper cases and clin-
ical simulations.
The ROC curve analyses illustrate that three cues
(respiration rate consciousness level and heart rate)
were primarily used to reach judgements (regardless of
simulation approach). This implies that nurses place
more importance on these three cues in risk assess-
ment judgements than the other two (systolic blood
pressure and temperature). These findings suggest that
nurses may “miss” information contained in an assess-
ment of risk in critically ill patients.
Strengths and limitations
In this study we used real patient cases to construct clinical
scenarios which substantially enhanced the representative-
ness of clinical scenarios. Despite this strength, it should be
recognised that cue intercorrelations are a feature of ‘vicari-
ous functioning’ [37] in real world judgement tasks. The
high levels of cue intercorrelations challenge the analysis of
relative importance of cues and a large number of judge-
ment tasks is required [38, 39]. Particularly, large numbers
of judgement tasks are practically limiting: participants’
boredom or impatience as a result of judging an excessive
number of tasks may influence their judgement processes
[40]. In this study we derived cue relative weights using cue
utilisation validity (cue-judgement correlation) and eco-
logical validity (cue-criterion correlation), as advocated by
Brunswik [20] and Hammond [26] in their early work.
These relative weights of validity coefficients are able to
index the independent contribution of each cue to the pre-
dictions of judgements and the ecology. This useful cue
weighting approach provides a more holistic picture of how
nurses value each cue compared to the ecological model.
Implication for research
Cognitive feedback, a type of feedback describing the rela-
tions between symptoms/signs and outcomes, essentially
captures the probabilistic nature of tasks and the inherent
uncertainty of environment [41, 42]. This type of feedback
could help improve nurses’ judgement performance.
For a typical task in risk assessments, not only are
nurses required to classify patients as at “risk” or “not
at risk”, but also to learn the relationships between
symptoms and disease outcomes. These relationships
(depicted as probabilistic functionalism [26, 43]) play a
significant role to help nurses gain such abilities in
probabilistic inference. Providing cognitive feedbacks
with task information has proved to be useful for
improving judgement performance in doctors [44–47].
The potential of using cognitive feedbacks to improve
nurses’ judgements should therefore be tested for
future research.
Conclusions
The findings from this study suggest that a mismatch
between nurses’ judgement strategies and a pertinent
ecological model may explain suboptimal judgement
performance. Our findings highlight the importance of
appropriate attention being paid to patients exhibiting
physiological abnormalities, and correct recognition of
patients at risk of acute deterioration. When making risk
assessments in practice, nurses should pay more atten-
tion to important cues such as respiration rate, con-
sciousness level and systolic blood pressure. Clinical
simulations recreating real patient cases have advantages
over paper based traditional approaches to simulation.
These simulations and the awareness they provide can
allow nurses to refine their judgement behaviours with
opportunities for reflection and correction. The report
by the National Patient Safety Agency [48] has revealed
that insufficient training to understand the relevance of
observations is one common factor contributing to
patient deterioration incidents not being recognised or
acted upon. Approaches such as cognitive feedback
could enhance understanding of the relationship
between clinical information and ecological criteria (for
example, physiological signs and symptoms and true
underlying risk of a critical event); it may also help
nurses appreciate more about the nature of uncertainty
in the probabilistic relationships that make up the
provision of healthcare.
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